OpenChainGraph Suite · DORA / NIS2 / ICT Resilience

Customer Security Controls Attestation Cycle

Note (dated 2026-08-04): a chain composes independent computations performed in an analytical order. No step's output is carried into the next step by the execution model; each step computes from its own declared inputs. This is true of every chain on this site, including chains whose per-step copy below reads as a data handoff.
Reading mode (READINESS-BUILD): These checks can be gathered in any order; the sequence below is for convenience. The control-coverage score and the assessor-eligibility test are two independent prerequisites checked separately before a joint release gate.

Two-step annual attestation cycle over a declared architecture type and component inventory. Step 1 derives the applicable mandatory and advisory control set from the policy-supplied control-framework version, scores declared implementation status, and returns coverage figures, a gap list keyed by published control number, an evidence index aligned to the framework's own supporting-evidence column, and an explicit not-applicable set with stated reasons so an omission cannot read as a pass. Step 2 tests assessor eligibility: assessment route, claimed certifications against the required set, independence from the implementer by distinct-identity counting, and assessment-date validity against the attestation deadline. Step 1 is gated hold while any mandatory control gap remains. Step 2 is gated reject, a terminal human rejection, when the assessor is ineligible, and the failing predicate is carried as the reason code. Release of the attestation bundle is a dual-control act with the assessor bound as reviewer and the attesting officer as approver; an examiner role binding grants inspection only and never an approval path. The framework's annual 31 December attestation deadline is a fact about the regime. This surface produces the firm's own evidence: it is not a Swift endorsement, not an assessor accreditation, and does not satisfy a KYC-SA submission.

OpenChainGraph · 2 Steps compliance mandate Hash-Anchored §4 chain_depth:2 Client-Side · Zero PII
Chain Topology: Control Applicability → Assessor Independence
§4 Execution Hash · Chain Definition Anchor
execution_hash:computing…
Chain Stages · 2 Steps
1 ROOT node hold
Control Applicability art-486-cscf-control-applicability
Applicable control set, coverage figures, gap list and evidence index keyed by control number feed the assessor-eligibility stage
§27 Human Accountability gate: an outstanding mandatory-control gap puts the cycle on hold until the gap is closed or explicitly dispositioned.
MCP Call · check_cscf_control_applicability
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "check_cscf_control_applicability",
    "arguments": {}
  },
  "id": 1
}
↓
2 TERMINAL node reject
Assessor Independence art-487-assessor-independence-check
Eligible or ineligible with the failing predicate named, closing the attestation evidence bundle. Final stage.
§27 Human Accountability gate: an ineligible assessor is a terminal reject, carrying the failing predicate as the reason code. Attestation release is a dual-control act with the assessor bound as reviewer and the attesting officer as approver; an examiner role binding grants inspection only, never an approval path.
MCP Call · check_assessor_independence
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "check_assessor_independence",
    "arguments": {}
  },
  "id": 1
}
Export Artifacts
Download the §4 chain definition artifact (hash-anchored composite JSON) or the §13.11 W3C Verifiable Credentials view. Both derive from the chain definition; no new hash is minted. Available after hash computation.

Ask your agent

Copy this paragraph into Claude, OpenClaw, or any MCP-aware agent to run this whole workflow on the server and check one field that answers a real question.

Question: We run a Swift architecture A1 setup. How much of the mandatory control set is covered by evidence we already hold?
Run the AINumbers MCP tool `run_chain` with {"chain":"swift-csp-attestation-cycle"} and read `art-486-cscf-control-applicability.mandatory_coverage_pct`.
Verify: call `verify_execution_hash` (https://mcp.ainumbers.co/mcp) with `claimed_hash` set to `composite_execution_hash` and the full `composite_artifact`.
Ledger, for a human re-check: https://ledger.ainumbers.co/
PII rule: send synthetic or anonymised inputs only. The MCP server runs these kernels and logs no payloads.
Chain page: https://ainumbers.co/chaingraph/chains/swift-csp-attestation-cycle.html