OpenChainGraph Suite · CONTRACT A3 · arch #5

TFR Travel-Rule Batch Conformance

Note (dated 2026-08-04): a chain composes independent computations performed in an analytical order. No step's output is carried into the next step by the execution model; each step computes from its own declared inputs. This is true of every chain on this site, including chains whose per-step copy below reads as a data handoff.

Originator/beneficiary field completeness on hashed/synthetic transfer batches incl. unhosted-wallet branch (ART-104) -> Merkle integrity (cry-04). Reuses the shipped synthetic-batch screening pattern; no real PII.

OpenChainGraph · 2 Steps cryptographic mandate Hash-Anchored §4 chain_depth:2 Client-Side · Zero PII
Chain Topology — TFR Travel-Rule Batch Validator → Merkle Batch Verifier
§4 Execution Hash · Chain Definition Anchor
execution_hash:computing…
Chain Stages · 2 Steps
1 ROOT · D0 node
TFR Travel-Rule Batch Validator art-104-tfr-travel-rule-batch-validator
batch conformance + flagged transfers (H1) feed the verifier
MCP Call · validate_tfr_travel_rule_batch
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "validate_tfr_travel_rule_batch",
    "arguments": {}
  },
  "id": 1
}
↓
2 TERMINAL · D2 node
Merkle Batch Verifier cry-04-merkle-batch-verifier
Exports composite travel-rule artifact with Merkle-root execution_hash (H2), final stage
MCP Call · verify_merkle_batch
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "verify_merkle_batch",
    "arguments": {}
  },
  "id": 1
}
Export Artifacts
Download the §4 chain definition artifact (hash-anchored composite JSON) or the §13.11 W3C Verifiable Credentials view. Both derive from the chain definition — no new hash is minted. Available after hash computation.

Ask your agent

Copy this paragraph into Claude, OpenClaw, or any MCP-aware agent to run this whole workflow on the server and check one field that answers a real question.

Question: This batch of transfers is ready to relay. Which records would the TFR validator flag before we send it?
Run the AINumbers MCP tool `run_chain` with {"chain":"mica-travel-rule"} and read `art-104-tfr-travel-rule-batch-validator.batch_conformance_pct`.
Re-run with `inputs` for `art-104-tfr-travel-rule-batch-validator`, reusing the values that result echoed, with `inputs` changed so one transfer omits the originator name. Compare the same field.
Verify: call `verify_execution_hash` (https://mcp.ainumbers.co/mcp) with `claimed_hash` set to `composite_execution_hash` and the full `composite_artifact`.
Ledger, for a human re-check: https://ledger.ainumbers.co/
PII rule: send synthetic or anonymised inputs only. The MCP server runs these kernels and logs no payloads.
Chain page: https://ainumbers.co/chaingraph/chains/mica-travel-rule.html