ECCN classification (ART-94) -> circumvention due-diligence + liability-allocation assessment vs the EU 20th-package no-Russia clause (ART-95) -> no-Russia-clause + DD-evidence pack (ART-96). The export-control diligence lifecycle. Decision-support draft.
classify_eccn_dual_use{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "classify_eccn_dual_use",
"arguments": {}
},
"id": 1
}
assess_circumvention_diligence{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "assess_circumvention_diligence",
"arguments": {}
},
"id": 1
}
build_no_russia_clause_pack{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "build_no_russia_clause_pack",
"arguments": {}
},
"id": 1
}
Copy this paragraph into Claude, OpenClaw, or any MCP-aware agent to run this whole workflow on the server and check one field that answers a real question.
Question: A reseller wants our controlled components shipped to a nearby hub. Does the diligence file support the no-Russia clause safe harbour?
Run the AINumbers MCP tool `run_chain` with {"chain":"export-control-circumvention"} and read `art-95-circumvention-diligence-assessor.no_russia_clause_status`.
Verify: call `verify_execution_hash` (https://mcp.ainumbers.co/mcp) with `claimed_hash` set to `composite_execution_hash` and the full `composite_artifact`.
Ledger, for a human re-check: https://ledger.ainumbers.co/
PII rule: send synthetic or anonymised inputs only. The MCP server runs these kernels and logs no payloads.
Chain page: https://ainumbers.co/chaingraph/chains/export-control-circumvention.html